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THE TREATY OF AMSTERDAM: THE NEXT 
STEPTOWARDSGENDEREQUALnnP. 
ELIZABETH F. DEFEIS* 
Abstract: This Article explores the evolution of the European Un-
ion s effort to achieve gender equality in employment and the impact 
of the Amsterdam Treaty on this effort. It examines the developments 
of the European Union, the legislation promulgated to promote 
equality between men and women in employment, and the decisions 
of the European Court of Justice in relation to such legislation. The 
Article then contrasts those efforts with United States law and fo-
cuses on positive action in the European Union, analyzes the rele-
vant decisions in this area-Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bre-
men and Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen. It then 
contrasts them with the United States experience with affirmative ac-
tion. FinaUy, the Article discusses the Amsterdam Treaty and both its 
impact on equality between men and women in employment and be-
yond the workplace through positive action. The likelihood of success 
of the Amsterdam Treaty in eradicating gender discrimination and 
promoting equal treatment between men and women is assessed. 
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Professor Defeis would like to 
thank her research assistants Kristen M. Jasket and Christina E. Giallourakis, Class of 2000. 
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With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men and women 
in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Mem-
ber State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific ad-
vantages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex to pursue a 
vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in profes-
sional careers. l 
INTRODUCTION 
When the European Union (EU) was established in 1957, its fo-
cus was on economic integration, not protecting human rights. Be-
cause of their common heritage of political ideals, freedom and the 
rule of law, EU Member States, along with several other European 
states, had earlier adopted the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and had provided 
for an elaborate enforcement mechanism for the protection of hu-
man rights through what is known as the Strasbourg process.2 
Although the Treaty of Rome (EC Treaty)3 contains a social 
chapter which deals with human rights to some extent and guarantees 
workers' rights, its primary goal is to improve working conditions and 
standards of living on a har~onized basis throughout the EU. But 
from its very inception, the EU has embodied the principle of gender 
equality, at least concerning equal pay for men and women in em-
ployment. Article 141 of the EC Treaty provides that women should 
1 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Estab-
lishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 1997 OJ. (C 340) [hereinaf-
ter Amsterdam Treaty], incorpurated into the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R 573 (1992), art. 141 (4) (as 
in effect in 1999) [hereinafter EC 1REATY]. As of May 1999, the Amsterdam Treaty's provi-
sions have been incorpOl'ated into both the EC Treaty and the Treaty on European Union. 
Citations to the EC Treaty and the Treaty on European Union reflect the 1999 incOlpora-
tions. 
2 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundaniental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 220 [hereinafter Convention]. The European Court of 
Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights sit in Strasbourg, and 
indhiduals, as well as Member States, may take complaints of human rights violations di-
rectly before the court. Jurisdiction over Member States is compulsory. All Member States 
of the EU and most potential members, such as Russia and Macedonia, have ratified the 
Convention. The European Court of Human Rights is separate and apart from the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) and the other mechanisms of the EU, such as the Commission 
and the Cowlcil. See Peter Leuprecht, InncnJations in the European System of Human Rights 
Protection: Is Enlargement Compatible with Rnn[urcement?, 8 "lRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
313 (1998). 
5 Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The EEC 
Treaty is also known as the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community and 
the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community. 
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"receive equal pay for equal work."4 This provision is, of course, in 
stark contrast to the United States Constitution, which to this day con-
tains no textual commitment to gender equality.5 In 1975, the Council 
adopted the Equal Pay Directive (EPD), which supplemented Article 
141 by requiring equal pay for "work to which equal value is attrib-
uted."6 Shortly thereafter, in 1976, the Council adopted the Equal 
Treatment Directive (ETD) , which expanded the scope of Article 141 
by establishing the principle of equal treatment regarding access to 
employment and sanctioning positive action programs.' These power-
ful directives, coupled with subsequent treaty amendments and deci-
sions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) sensitive to human rights 
concerns, have established a jurisprudence of human rights witllin 
the EU. 
The Treaty of Amsterdanl (Amsterdam Treaty)8 aims to integrate 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms into the formal 
structure of the EU. It also strengthens and focuses the European 
commitment to gender equality and extends the equality principle of 
Article 141 beyond tlle workplace. As a result, the EU itself now has a 
general obligation in all of its actions not only to strive to eliminate 
inequalities but also to advocate equality between men and women.9 
Unfortunately, it is generally acknowledged that the Amsterdam 
Treaty has not been successflll in fulfilling its other goals of reforming 
the cumbersome institutional structure of the EU and addressing the 
democracy deficit.l° VVhether the Amsterdam Treaty's provisions per-
4 EC TREATY, supra note 1, art. 141. 
5 The United States Constitution contained no equality prO\ision until the adoption of 
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. The effectiveness of this prO\ision, even as applied to 
its core pUlpose-race-was virtually nonexistent until the latter half of this century. Gen-
der discrimination was excluded from its scope until 1971, and even today, its effectiveness 
with respect to gender discrimination is limited. Thus, the equality principle in the United 
States is not as powerful a force as it is in the EU. 
6 Council Directive 75/117, 1975 OJ. (L 45) 19. 
7 See Council Directive 76/207,1976 OJ. (L 39) 40. 
8 EC TREATY, supra note 1, all. 141 (4). The fifteen Member States negotiated the Am-
sterdam Treaty during an Intergovernmental Conference beginning in March 1996. See 
Youri Devuyst, European Union: Consolidated ler:sion of the Treaty on European Union and COIl-
solidated lersion of the Treaty Establishing the European Communit)\ 37 1.L.1\1. 56 (1998). The 
Amsterdam Treaty contains the amendments to the previous treaties and provides for re-
numbering of "articles, titles, and sections of the existing Treaty on European Union and 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community." [d. at 57. The Amsterdam Treaty 
contains a preamble, fifteen articles, a table of equivalencies, thirteen protocols, fifty-one 
declarations by the IGC and eight declarations by indhidual Member States. See id. at 56. 
9 See White Paper, at 4.16 (visited Jan. 24,2000) <http://www.idgode/whitepaper/>. 
10 See Philippe Manin, The Treaty of Amsterdam, 4 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1 (1998). 
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taining to human rights and gender equality will have a greater sub-
stantive impact has yet to be assessed. 
This Article explores the evolution of the EU's effort to achieve 
gender equality in employment and the impact of the Amsterdam 
Treaty on this effort. Part I examines the development of the EU, the 
legislation promulgated to promote equality between men and 
women in employment, and the decisions of the ECl in relation to 
such legislation. Part I then contrasts those efforts with United States 
law. Part II focuses on positive action in the EU, analyzes the relevant 
decisions in this area-Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremenll and Mar-
schall v. Land Nordrhein-Westjalen,12 and contrasts them with the United 
States' experience with affirmative action. Part III discusses the Am-
sterdam Treaty and both its impact on equality between men and 
women in employment and beyond the workplace through positive 
action. Finally, this Article assesses the likelihood of success of the 
Amsterdam Treaty in eradicating gender discrimination and promot-
ing equal treatment between men and women. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU AND THE ACTIONS TAKEN TO PROMOTE 
THE EQUALITY OF MEN AND WOMEN IN EMPLOYMENT 
In 1951, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands signed the Treaty of Paris that established the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community.13 In 1957, the same six countries 
signed the EC Treaty, which established the European Economic Un-
ion. The Paris and Rome treaties are the functional equivalent of a 
constitution for the EU. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
joined the European Community (now the EU) in 1973; Greece 
joined in 1981; and Spain and Portugal joined in 1986. In 1992, the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU), also known as the Treaty of Maas-
tricht, amended the EC Treaty and created what is now known as the 
EU,14 The final Member States-Sweden, Finland and Austria-were 
added in 1995. The following thirteen countries have submitted ap-
plications for membership: Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Re-
11 Case C-450/93, 1995 E.C.R 1-3051, [1996]1 C.M.L.R 175 (1995). 
12 Case C-409/95, [1997] All ER (EC) 865 (1997), [1998] CEC (CCH) 152 (1997). 
13 For a general description of the histOlical development of the EU, see Eleanor M. 
Fox, Vision of Europe: Lessons for the World, in EUROPEAN UNION LAw ANTHOLOGY 1, 9-15 
(Karen V. Kole & Anthony D'Amato eds., 1998). See Rebecca Means, Kalanke v. Freie 
Hansestadt Bremen: The Significance of the Kalanke Decision on Future Positive Action Programs 
in the European Union, 30 VAND.J. 'fRANSNAT'L L. 1087, 1091 (1997). 
14 Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hel-einafter TEU]. 
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public, Slovenia, Cyprus, Turkey, Malta, Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, 
Lithuania and Slovakia.15 The Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997, 
amends the TEU, the treaties establishing the European Communities 
(the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the European Community) and certain related 
acts.16 
A. Article 141 
Article 141 of the EC Treaty is the most powerful provision of its 
social chapter. It is the only article that imposes a positive duty on 
Member States, and it has a double aim which is both economic and 
social,17 Article 141 obliges member states to "ensure and subse-
quently maintain the application of the principle that men and 
women should receive equal pay for equal work. "18 Article 141 defines 
"pay" as "the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other 
consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the worker receives, 
directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment from his em-
ployer. "19 Pay has been interpreted broadly to include occupational 
pension schemes, temporary post-employment payments, sick bene-
fits, severance allowances and travel concessions.20 Article 141 further 
provides for equal pay without discrimination, requiring that pay for 
identical work should be calculated on the same unit of measurement 
and at the same time rates.21 
15 See GEORGE A BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
LAw 4 (Supp. 1998). 
16 See Amsterdam Treaty, supra note 1. 
17 See Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge de Na\igation Aerienne Sabena, 
1976 E.C.R 455, 472 [hereinafter Defrtmne 11]. 
18 EC 1REATY, supra note 1, art. 141. "The narrowness of this defInition constituted a 
political compromise and contrasted with that adapted by the Intenlational Labour Or-
ganization ... in which equal pay was defIned as 'work of equal \·alue.'fl JUNE NEILSON, 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR ",rOMEN IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 64 (U. 
of Aberdeen, U.K. 1998) (citing Convention No. 100 on Equal Remuneration, 1951). 
19 EC ThEATY, supra note 1, art. 141. 
20 See Case C33/89, Kowalska v. Freie und Hallsestadt Hamburg, 1990 E.C.R 1-2591 
(temporary post-employment payments); Case 262/88, Barber \'. Guardian Royal Exch. 
Assurance Group, 1990 E.C.R 1-1889, [1990] 2 C.M.L.R 513 (1990) (l'edundancy pay-
ments); Case 171/88, Rinner-Kuhn v. FWW Spezialgebaudereinigung, [1993] 2 C.M,L.R 
932 (1989) (maintenance of salary in case of sickness): Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus 
GmbH v. von Hartz, 1986 E.C.R 1607, [1986] 2 C.I\I.L.R 701 (1986): Case 12/81, Garland 
v. British Rail Eng. Ltd., 1982 E.C.R 359. [1982] 1 C.I\I.L.R 696 (1982) (voluntary travel 
concessions for retirees); Case 69/80. \\'onillghalll ,'. Lloyd's Bank Ltd., 1981 E.C.R 767, 
[1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 1 (1981) (se"erance allowallces). 
21 SeeEC TREATY, supra note 1. an. 141. 
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Article 141 has been the subject of voluminous EU legislation 
and litigation that has led to an extensive body of case law. Under the 
constitutional structure of the EU, any state court or tribunal of a 
Member State may refer a question to the ECl for a preliminary rul-
ing. In addition, Article 141 allows any individual to refer a question 
to the ECl. Many of these questions come from Denmark, Germany, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom due to more effective pro-
cedures for attacking discrimination, trade organizations and active 
rights groups in these states. The constitutional structure has thus en-
abled individuals and organizations in Member States to pursue test 
cases to develop the law, even when the outcome is doubtful. Conse-
quently, EU law on sex discrimination in employment may be de-
scribed as a "mini-constitution." 
The precise scope of the equality principle is not static but is con-
stantly in flux, and the ECl has been extremely influential in develop-
ing the principle of equality.22 In 1978, the ECJ declared that "respect 
for fundamental personal human rights is one of the general princi-
ples of Community law .... There can be no doubt that the elimina-
tion of discrimination based on sex forms part of those fundamental 
rights. ''23 Thus, the ECJ expanded the equal pay principle into a gen-
eral equality right between women and men which exists at the core 
of EU law.24 It has been argued that, although the equality right de-
rives from Article 141 because of its status as primary treaty legisla-
tion, Article 141 is not the source. Rather, Chris Docksey has ex-
plained that Article 141 "is part of the implementation of the principle 
... [and] has been complemented by an advanced Union legislative 
code ... [therefore,] ... all the legislation on equality, both primary 
and derived, directly embodies and is sustained by the principle of 
equality. ''25 
22 See Defrenne II, supra note 17. 
23 Case 149/77, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 
1978 E.C.R 1365, 1374 [hereinafter Defrenne Ill]. 
24 The Council adopted six directives between 1975 and 1992: (1) the EPD of 1975; 
(2) the ETD of 1976; (3) the 1978 Social Security Directive; (4) the 1986 Directive on 
equal treatment in occupational social security schemes; (5) the 1986 Directive on equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity including agriculture in a self-
employed capacity and on the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and 
motherhood; and (6) the 1992 Directive on the protection of pregnant women from expo-
sure to hazardous substances in the workplace and on rights to maternity leave. See Sonia 
Mazey, The European Union and women's rights: from the Europeanization of the national agendas 
to the nationalization ofaEuropean a~nda,J. EUR. PUB. POL'y 131, 140 (1998). 
25 Chris Docksey, Sex Discrimination, in EUROPEAN UNION LAw ANTHOLOGY 360, 361 
(Karen V. Kole & Anthony D'Anlato eds., 1998). 
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B. Equal Pay Directive of 1975 
Article 141 is the articulated basis of all other ED legislation re-
garding equality between men and women in employment. However, 
it was economic rather than social concerns that led to the inclusion 
of Article 141 in the EC Treaty.26 At the time, France was the only 
country in the ED in which workers by law were entitled to equal 
pay.27 Because France feared its businesses would be competitively 
under-priced by businesses in other Member States that had no equal 
pay for men and women requirement, it insisted on the implementa-
tion of "equal pay for equal work" for both men and women in all 
Member States.28 
Member States were required to enact their own legislation of 
"equal pay for equal work" by January 1, 1962.29 Compliance was ex-
tended to the end of 1964, because only some Member States had 
adopted such legislation.3o Even with the extension, not all Member 
States complied. Infringement proceedings were eventually instituted 
against all of the Member States that failed to comply.31 
As a result of the uneven application of Article 141 among Mem-
ber States, the Council issued the Equal Pay Directive. The EPD of 
1975 implemented the equality principle of Article 141 and made 
Member States' obligations under Article 141 more specific. It incor-
porated a comparable worth standard by defining equal pay as "the 
same work or for work to which equal value is attributed"32 and 
brought the ED in line with the International Labor Convention No. 
26 See NEILSON, supm note 18, at 65. 
27 See George A BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
LAw 1158 (1993). 
28 See id. 
29 See NEILSON, supm note 18, at 64. 
30 SeeBERMANN, supra note 27, at 1158. 
51 See NEILSON, supra note 18, at 65-67. The Conullission noted that "whilst very sub-
stantial efforts have been made to give effect to the Directive, considerable areas of uncer-
tainty remain and some elements of the Directive have only been implemented in part." 
[d. at 67. 
32 Council Directive 75/117, supm note 6. At the time the EPD was enacted 
equal-pay legislation existed to some degree only in France ... Ireland ... 
Luxembourg ... and the United Kingdom .... The other member states were 
thus obliged to enact suitable legislation. However, by February 1976 (the 
deadline for implementation), Belgium, Germany and Italy had all failed to 
enact any legislation, while gaps in compliance with the Directive were appal'-
ent in the laws of Denmark ... France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands ... and 
the United Kingdom. 
NEILSON, supra note 18, at 66. 
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100.33 The EPD also required that a '10b classification system" be 
nondiscriminatory in charactel; 34 called for the abolition of all gender 
discrimination resulting fram existing laws or provisions, and re-
quired protection for employees who had lodged a complaint based 
on the EPD.35 
Under the EPD, Member States must assure that both collective 
bargaining agreements applicable to industry and private employ-
ment contracts abide by the equal pay principle. They must also gen-
erally "ensure that the principle of equal pay is applied," establish ju-
dicial procedures to enable enforcement, and inform employees of 
these rights "at their place of employment."36 
Shortly after the enactment of the EPD, an action was brought in 
the Belgian courts by Defrenne, an employee of Sabena, who claimed 
that Sabena's practice of paying the male cabin stewards more than 
the female cabin stewards violated Article 14l.37 The Labor Court of 
Brussels referred the case to the ECl for a preliminary ruling. 
In Defrenne II, the ECJ ruled that Article 141 had a "direct ef-
fect"38 in Member States and that an individual had a right to sue not 
only Member States or one of their instrumentalities but also private 
actors in state courts, whether or not domestic legislation implement-
33 See NEILSON, supra note 18, at 66. 
34 See Council Directive 75/117, supra note 6. 
35 See id. No sanctions were imposed "against an employer who dismissed an employee 
for instituting a legal claim" or against an employer who otherwise infringed on the EPD. 
NEILSON, supra note 18, at 66. 
36 See Council Directive 75/117. 
37 See Defnmne II, supra note 17, at 471. 
38 Although Article 141 was to have a direct effect on claims accruing from the date of 
the ECj'sjudgment and on claims already filed, the direct effect of Article 141 was not to 
be given retroactive effect. See id. at 48l. 
[I]t is appropriate to take exceptionality into account the fact that, over a 
prolonged period, the parties concerned have been led to continue in prac-
tices which were contrary to Article 119 [now Article 141], although not yet 
prohibited under their national law .... In these circumstances, it is appro-
priate to determine that, as the general level at which pay would have been 
fixed cannot be known, important considerations of legal certainty affecting 
all the interests involved, both public and private, make it impossible in prin-
ciple to reopen the question as regards the past. Therefore, the direct effect 
of Ai-ticle 119 [now Article 141] cannot be relied on in order to support 
claims concerning pay periods prior to the date of this judgment, except as 
regards those workers who have already brought legal proceedings or made 
an equivalent claim. 
Id. at 480-81. 
1999] Gender Equality 9 
ing Article 141 existed.39 The ECJ distinguished between the direct 
discrimination resulting from violating the principle of equal pay for 
equal work and indirect or disguised discrimination, and limited di-
rect effect to cases of direct discrimination. Because the ECl held that 
Article 141 has both a direct effect and a vertical effect and thus 
reaches private obligations, its impact on equality has been substan-
tial. 
The United States, however, has taken a different approach with 
respect to wage equity. Unlike the EU approach, equal pay for work of 
comparable value is not specifically authorized by United States fed-
eral legislation, and indeed, in the United States, comparable worth 
continues to be very controversial. The United States Equal Pay Act of 
1963 (EPA)40 was enacted to address the national and international 
problem caused by paying women less than men for the same work. It 
requires equal pay for work that is performed under similar working 
conditions and that demands the same skill, effort and responsibility. 
Although a claim for equal pay for work of comparable worth cannot 
be brought under the EPA, in 1981 the United States Supreme Court 
in County of Washington v. Gunthe141 held that under some circum-
stances women who perform work not equal to, but comparable to, 
that performed by men can bring a claim against their employers 
based on sex-based wage discrimination. 
In Gunther, female prison guards brought a Title VII claim against 
their county employer for wage discrimination because male prison 
guards were paid higher wages. The plaintiffs argued that they were 
paid less for work that was substantially equal to that of male guards, 
and alternatively, that the county intentionally discriminated against 
the female guards because of their sex. The female guards based the 
latter claim on the fact that after conducting a survey of the market 
value of the job, the county increased the salary of male guards to re-
flect the survey but left the salary of female guards unchanged. 
In upholding the claim, the Court was clear to point out that the 
claim was not based on what it called "the controversial concept of 
39 See id. at 476. The ECJ noted its frustration with the ''failure of Member States to im-
plement directives created to ensure that discriminatmy laws were in place within the 
Member States' borders." Laura Molinari, The Effect of the Kalanke Decision on the European 
Union: A Decision with Teeth but Little Bite, 71 ST.JOHN'S L. RE\". 591,610 (1997) (citing Ta-
line Aharonian, Equal Value in the European Union: Fiction or Reality?, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 91, 
110 (1995)). 
40 29 U.S.CA § 206 (West 1982). 
41 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
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comparative worth"42 but rather on intentional discrimination. The 
intentional discrimination consisted of setting the female wage scale 
at a lower level than that set out in the county's own survey while at 
the same time adjusting the male guards' salary to the prevailing 
higher survey level. The Court did not explain how sex-based wage 
discrimination litigation under Tide VII should be structured. It did, 
however, seem to open the door to claims of wage discrimination 
based on comparable worth.43 
Overall, asserting comparable worth as a litigation strategy has 
not been successful in the United States. When considering compara-
ble worth claims, United States courts have focused on whether the 
employer was in fact paying market wages and have overlooked the 
fact that by paying such market wages, employers may be exploiting 
societal biases, stereotypes and past discrimination.44 
The ECl, on the other hand, has been less receptive to the argu-
ment that market forces justify wage disparities.45 Together with the 
Commission, the ECl has been forceful in regulating and providing 
guidance to implement the comparable worth standard throughout 
the EU. Despite such efforts, wage disparities continue to exist in the 
EU. One EUROSTAT survey conducted in four Member States reveals 
that women's salaries are still lagging. Women's hourly earnings in 
relation to men's are only 84% in Sweden, 73% in France and Spain 
and 64% in the U.K (these figures are for full-time and part-time 
workers but do not include earnings for overtime).46 
There are now efforts in the United States to address comparable 
worth that would bring equal pay issues more in . line with the EU 
model. In 1997, the Fair Pay Act was introduced into the United 
42Id. at 166. The Court further explained that 
[a]ll we know is that Title VII provides a remedy when, as here, plaintiffs seek 
to show by direct evidence that their employer intentionally depressed their 
wages. And, for reasons that go largely unexplained, we also know that a Title 
VII remedy may not be available to plaintiffs who allege theories different 
than that alleged here, such as the so-called "comparable worth" theory. 
Id. at 183. 
43 The Court explicitly stated that "[t]he opinion does not endorse [the] so-called 
'comparable worth' theory; though the Court does not indicate how a plaintiff might es-
tablish a prima facie case under Title VII." Id. at 203. 
44 SeeAnlerican Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1986); Spaulding v. Uni-
versity of Wash., 740 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984). 
45 See Case C-127/92, Enderby v. Frenchay Health Authority, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 8 
(1993). 
46 See Women: Equal Opportunities, (visited Nov. 1, 1999) <http://eur-op.eu.int/en/ 
opnews/ 497 /r374.htm>. 
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States Congress to address comparable worth. It was designed to "pro-
vide for equal pay for work in jobs that are comparable in skill, effort, 
responsibility and working conditions"47 and to prohibit employers 
from paying wages to employees "at a rate less than the rate at which 
the employer pays wages to employees . . . in another job that is 
dominated by employees of the opposite sex ... for work on equiva-
lent jobs."48 The bill was based upon a congressional finding that 
"wage rate differentials exist between equivalent jobs segregated by 
sex, race, and national origin" and that "disClimination in hiring and 
promotion has played a role in maintaining a segregated work 
force."49 The Fair Pay Act was reintroduced in Congress in March 
1999.50 If enacted, the Act would bring the United States closer both 
to the EU model and to wage equity. 
C. Equal Treatment Directive of 1976 
Experience in the United States demonstrated that equal pay 
provisions were insufficient to create equality in the workplace. Con-
sequently, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 was followed by Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment in general. Similarly, in the EU, it became apparent that some-
thing more than wage equity was required to achieve gender equality 
in employment. For example, two years after challenging Sabena's 
discriminatory pay policy, Defrenne brought another suit claiming 
that Sabena's forced retirement of female, but not male, stewards at 
age forty violated Article 14J.51 The ECJ ruled that Article 141 per-
tained only to equal pay and could not support a claim for equal 
treatment. The Court defined the limits of Article 141 as relating to 
"pay discrimination between men and women workers. "52 As a result, 
the EPD was followed one year later by the ETD.53 
Article 1 of the ETD addresses gender discrimination in "access 
to employment, including promotion[s], and ... vocational training 
and as regards working conditions. "54 Article 2 further declares that 
47 143 CONGo REc. S804-03, (daily ed.Jan. 29, 199i) (statement of Sen. Tom Harkin). 
48 S. 232, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (199i). 
49 Id. 
50 145 CONGo REc. E545 (daily ed. Ma1~ 24, 1999) (statement of Sen. Eleanor Hohnes 
Norton). 
51 See Dejrenne III, supm note 23, at 13i6. 
52Id. 
53 See Council Directive i6/20i, sllpm note i. 
54Id. 
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"the principal of equal treatment shall mean that there shall be no 
discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex either directly or indi-
rectly by reference in particular to marital or family status. "55 
The ETD does, however, allow for derogation in three instances. 
Article 2(2) allows employers to discriminate on grounds of sex if sex 
"constitutes a determining factor" in the nature or context of the 
job.56 Article 2(3) sanctions protective treatment regarding pregnancy 
and maternity, while Article 2(4) permits positive action programs for 
women to promote equal opportunity.57 Article 2(4) states that it 
"shall be without prejudice to measures to promote equal opportunity 
for men and women, in particular by removing existing inequalities 
which affect women's opportunities in the areas referred to in Article 
1 (1)."58 
Like the EPD, the ETD required Member States to implement 
the directive and to eliminate any current regulations or laws contrary 
to the principles embodied in the ETD.59 Also similar to the EPD, 
Member States were not quick to implement the ETD into their laws 
and eventually were forced to comply.60 Although implementation of 
the EPD and ETD lagged, both directives raised European awareness 
of gender issues in employment and accelerated the evolution of 
"equal pay for equal work" from an economic goal to the broad-based 
social goal of equality.61 
55 [d. 
56 See id. This limitation in the ETD can be paralleled to the narrowly interpreted Title 
VII bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) which permits an employer to hire on 
the basis of religion, sex or national OIigin where those qualities become a bona fide occu-
pational qualification reasonably necessary to the nonllal operation of the business. See 42 
U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(e); see also 29 C.F.R § 1604.2. To warrant this exception, the employer 
must prove that the factors used to determine whether gender is a determining factor are 
objective. See Elena Noel, Prevention of Gender Discrimination Within the European Union, 9 
N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 77, 86 (1996). In addition, for this exception to apply, the risk faced by a 
woman must be higher than the Iisk faced by a man rather than mere public opinion that 
favors protection for women. See id. at 86-87; see also Case 222/84, Jolmston v. Chief Con-
stable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 E.C.R 1651. 
57 See Council Directive 76/207, supra note 7. 
58 [d. 
59 Seeid. art. 5(2)(b). 
60 See NEILSON, supra note 18, at 67. 
61 This is further e\idenced by the fact that in 1984, the Council adopted the Commis-
siOlI's recommendation that Article 2(4) of the ETD should approve positive action pro-
grams favOling women. See COllllnunication from the Commission to the European Par-
liament and the Council on the inte1pretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice on 
17 October 1995 in Case C450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, COM(96)88 fi-
nal, at 3 (citing Council Recommendation 84/635 EEC on the Promotion of Positive Ac-
tion for Women, 1984 OJ. (L 331) 34) [hereinafter Communication on the Kalanke Rul-
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Even though the equality principle of Article 2 allows for deroga-
tion in three instances, most cases initially focused on the derogation 
in Article 2(3) dealing with the protection of women regarding preg-
nancy and maternity. For example, in Hofmann v. Ersatzkasse,62 which 
involved the German Law for the Protection of Working Mothers, 63 
mothers were entitled to a "compulsory convalescence period of eight 
weeks' leave after childbirth" and a "maternity leave" to commence at 
the end of the convalescence period and to end when the baby 
reached six months of age.54 At the end of this period, the mother 
would be entitled to return to her job under previous conditions.65 
The plaintiff, Hofmann, acknowledged paternity of his illegiti-
mate child and obtained unpaid leave from his job for the period af-
ter the eight weeks' maternity leave had expired until the child 
reached six months. His application for paid maternity benefits was 
refused on the grounds that only "mothers" were able to receive such 
compensation.66 He appealed the refusal as contrary to the equality 
rights guaranteed by the ETD67 and further claimed that the decision 
as to who would assume responsibility for the child's care should be 
left to the parents.68 
The Eel rejected Hofmann's challenge and ruled that Member 
States were not required to provide benefits to fathers of newborn 
children even if a father actually assumed responsibility for the child's 
rearing.69 The ECJ held that one of the legitimate intents of the Di-
rective, particularly under Article 2(3), was to protect a woman's 
physical and mental health both during and after pregnancy and to 
protect the relationship a mother forms with her child by keeping it 
unhampered by simultaneous employment constraints.70 Finally. the 
ing]. The recommendation encouraged Member States to create positive action programs 
to remedy existing inequalities plaguing women in the labor force and to achieve a bal-
ance between men and women in employment. See id. 
62 Case 184/83, [1983-1985 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ,14,117 
(1984). 
63 The German law is also known as Gesetz zum Schutz der Erwerbstatigen Mutter. 
64 Case 184/83, supra note 62, at 15,499. 
65 See Uf. 
66 See id. at 15,499-500. Such a mling is justified because a mother alone suffers physi-
cal conditions resulting from a pregnancy. See id. at 15,500. Hofmann argued that the focus 
of the law should be on the care the child receives, rather than on the health of the 
mothel: See id. 
67 See id.; see also Directive 76/207, supra note 7, arts. 2(3) and 5(1). 
68 See Case 184/83, supra note 62, at 15,514. 
69 See id. at 15,516; see also Gabriel Moens, Equal OppOI-tunities Not Equal Results: "Equal 
oppOl-tunity" in European Law After Kalanke, 23 J. LEGIS. 43, 47 (1997). 
70 See Case 184/83, supra note 62, at 15,515. 
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Court stated that a woman is entitled to legal protection to avoid con-
flicting duties between maintaining employment and raising a child.71 
Protective legislation for women was also tested in Commission v. 
France,72 which involved the redrafted French labour Code. The re-
drafted labour Code provided "that any term reserving the benefit of 
any measure to employees on grounds of sex included in any collec-
tive labour agreement shall be void, except where such a clause is in-
tended to implement the provisions relating to pregnancy, nursing or 
pre-natal and post-natal rest. ''73 The labour Code allowed for collec-
tive agreements or contracts to grant special rights to women.7-l Some 
of these "special rights" included a Mother's Day holiday, shorter work 
hours for women older than 59 years, extra days off from work for 
each child, an earlier retirement age, periodic breaks for women who 
are typists or switchboard operators or who work on computers, and 
additional maternity leave beyond the usual period.7s Although some 
of these measures can be justified under Articles 2(3) and 2(4), the 
ECJ held that the overall effect of these rights is not justified under 
these articles of the ETD for an indefinite period. 76 
The United States' position on protective legislation for women 
has been problematic. While Title VII of the Civil Rights Act has been 
interpreted to bar protective legislation solely for women, federal leg-
islation now prohibits discrimination based on pregnancy. In Geduldig 
v. Aiello, the Supreme Court sustained a California disability insurance 
program which excluded any disability caused by or arising in connec-
tion with pregnancy.77 The Court refused to view the program as dis-
criminating on the basis of gender under the Equal Protection 
Clause.7s Conversely, the EEOC in 1972 determined that employment 
policies relating to pregnancy were discriminatory and issued guide-
lines which brought differential treatment of pregnancy under Title 
VII's prohibition on sex discrimination.79 In General Electric Co. v. 
71 See id. at 15,514. Advocate General Darmon also reiterated that Member States were 
solely responsible for the measures enacted to guarantee the protection of women follow-
ing childbirth and to prevent any disadvantages they may suffer in the work fOl-ce due to a 
maternity leave. See id. at 15,515. In \iew of social developments since that time, it is un-
likely that the ECJ would reach the same result today. 
72 Case C312/86, 1988 E.C.R 6315, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R 408 (1988). 
73 Id., 3. 
74 See id. , 8. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. , 9. 
77 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). 
78Id. at 496-97 11.20. 
79 See 29 C.F.R § 1604.10 (1985). 
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Gilbert, however, the Court repudiated the applicable EEOC guide-
lines and held that an employer's exclusion of pregnancy-related dis-
abilities from the coverage of an employee's disability income plan 
did not constitute sex discrimination prosClibed by Title VII.8o In re-
sponse, Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.81 Under 
the Act, employers are not required to provide maternity benefits, but 
if they provide medical or disability benefits, they cannot exclude 
pregnancy. Congress later enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act82 
which is at least a small step towards the EU model. 
The ETD's Article 2(2) provision allowing an employer to dis-
criminate by gender if sex "constitutes a determining factor" in the 
nature or context of the job has been narrowly construed. In those 
instances where neither maternity nor pregnancy are involved, the 
ECJ has been less willing to recognize an exception to the equality 
principle. To warrant this exception, the employer must prove that 
the criteria used to determine whether gender is a determining factor 
are objective. In one such case, Johnston v. RUe, the United Kingdom 
argued unsuccessfully that there is a general derogation implicit in 
the EC Treaty for all measures covering public safety.83 The ECJ held 
that for this exception to apply, the risk faced by a woman must be 
higher than the risk faced by a man, rather than mere public opinion 
that favors protection for women. The Court explained that the ex-
ception derogates from tlle principle of equality and must be strictly 
construed.84 
A second case involving the scope of the Article 2 (2) exception, 
Sir dar v. Army Board,85 is now pending before the ECJ. It involves the 
application of a woman who served in the Catering Corps of the Brit-
ish Army as a chef from 1983 until 1995 when she was made red un-
80 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976). 
81 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (West 1993). 
82 5 U.S.C.A. § 6381 et seq.; 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601 et seq. (West 1993). 
83 Case 222/84. Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, 1986 
E.C.R 1651, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R 240 (1986). 
84 The court held, howevel; that: 
public safety may justif}' a derogation under Article 2 (2), if it is proved to be 
necessary in the specific case, and if it conforms to the principle of propor-
tionality. That principle requires that derogations remain within the limits of 
what is appropriate and necessary for achie\1ng the aim in dew and requires 
the principle of equal treatment to be reconciled as far as possible with the 
l'equirements of that [aim]. 
Id. at 368. 
85 Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola. Case C-273/97 (May 18,1999). 
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dant and was offered a transfer to the Royal Marines. When it was 
found she was a woman, the offer was withdrawn because the Royal 
Marines exclude women on the grounds of inter-operability-the 
need for a Marine to be able to fight as a commando regardless of 
specialization. The Industrial Tribunal found that the Royal Marines 
are a small (2% of the British armed forces) and combat-ready fight-
ing force. According to the principle of "inter-operability," Royal Ma-
rines are all trained as commandos and are required to participate in 
front-line activity at any time. The case has been referred to the ECl 
for it to consider whether this situation qualifies as an exception un-
der Article 2(2) of the ETD or under Article 224 (now Article 297) of 
the EC Treaty. 
The ETD Article 2(2) exception is similar to the United States 
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception in the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of the Act is the most comprehensive and 
effective federal legislation dealing with gender discrimination-
much more expansive than the Equal Pay Act which is limited to wage 
discrimination. Title VII prohibits discrimination in all terms and 
conditions of employment on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin or sex.86 It protects the rights of persons to obtain and 
hold a job, as well as the right to equal treatment once the job has 
been obtained, and covers employers with fifteen or more workers.87 
Similar to the EU model, Title VII does allow for discrimination based 
on sex if sex is a bona fide occupational qualification of the job, but 
this exception has been narrowly construed and permitted in very few 
instances. In the only case considered by the United States Supreme 
Court concerning the BFOQ exception, the Court upheld the 
exception, but concluded that it should be construed narrowly. The 
State of Alabama was allowed to exclude women from serving as 
prison guards because of the risk of sexual assault from prisoners and 
Id. 
86 42 U.S.CA § 2000e-2(a). 
It shall be an unlawful emplopnent practice for an employer: (1) to fail or re-
fuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such an individual's race, color, relig-
ion, sex, or national OIigiIl. 
87 42 U.S.CA § 2000e-(b). 'The term 'employer' means a pel'son engaged in an indus-
u-y affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each 
of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." Id. 
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of the risk of sexual assault from prisoners and a general concern for 
prison security.88 
II. POSITIVE ACTION IN THE EU 
The ECJ has given substance to, and has been strict in enforcing, 
the principle of "equal pay for equal work." Nevertheless, it has fol-
lowed an unsteady course with respect to positive action programs. 
Article 2(4) of the ETD permits, but does not require Member States 
to adopt positive action measures.89 It provides that the principle of 
nondiscrimination "shall be without prejudice to measures to pro-
mote equal opportunity for men and women, in particular by remov-
ing existing inequalities which affect women's opportunities."9o Al-
though there is no official definition of positive action, there is a 
consensus in the EU that "the concept of positive action embraces all 
measures which aim to counter the effects of past discrimination, to 
eliminate existing discrimination and to promote equality of oppor-
tunity between women and men, particularly in relation to types or 
levels of jobs where members of one sex are significantly under-
represented.''91 The Council has identified a wide range of positive 
action measures which can be adopted, including goals and timeta-
bles. Two recent cases dealing with positive action provisions indicate 
the difficulty that the ECJ has had with crafting a coherent jurispru-
dence with respect to positive action programs. 
A. Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen 
In Kalanke v. Fnde Hansestadt Bremen, Kalanke sued on grounds of 
sex discrimination when pursuant to a German law, he was passed 
over for employment in favor of an equally qualified female co-
worker.92 The German law provided: 
[i]n the case of an appointment ... [or] ... assignment to a 
position in a higher pay. remuneration and salary bracket, 
women who have the same qualifications as men applying 
for the same post are to be given priority if they are under-
represented .... There is under-representation if women do 
88 See Dothard v. Rawlinson. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
89 Several Member States have adopted positin' action programs including Belgium. 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the U.h. Srr I\leallS. slIpm note 13. at 1116-17. 
90 Council Directh'e 76/207. slIpm note i. 
91 Communication on the Kalanke Ruling. slIpm note 61. 
92 See Case C-450 /93. supm note 11. 
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not make up at least half of the staff in the individual pay, 
remuneration and salary brackets in the relevant personnel 
group within a department.93 
The Bundesarbeitsgericht, also known as the Federal Labour Court, 
referred the case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. 
The ECJ acknowledged that the German law is "designed to allow 
measures which, although discriminatory in appearance, are in fact 
intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of inequality which 
may exist in the reality of social life. ''94 Nonetheless, the ECJ held that 
the German law, whose aim is to "guarantee women absolute and un-
conditional priority for appointment or promotion go[es] beyond 
promoting equal opportunities and overstep[s] the limits of the ex-
ception in Article 2(4) of the Directive.''95 In addition, the ECl stated 
"in so far as it seeks to achieve equal representation of men and 
women in all grades and levels within a department, such a system 
substitutes for equality of opportunity as envisaged in Article 2(4) the 
result which is only to be arrived at by providing such equality of op-
portuni ty. ''96 
No doubt the ECl was influenced by the comprehensive opinion 
of Advocate General Tesauro,97 who reviewed the rationale for posi-
tive action and cited numerous United States sources.98 Advocate 
General Tesauro noted that positive action attempts to eliminate the 
obstacles affecting a particular disadvantaged category of individuals 
in the labor market.99 He recognized the necessity for positive action 
programs and described positive action programs as "a means of 
achieving equal opportunities for minority or ... disadvantaged groups, 
which generally takes place through the granting of preferential 
treatment to the groups in question" for "a collective vision of equal-
93Id. at 19l. 
94Id. at 193-94 (citing Case 312/86, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R 6315, [1989] 1 
C.M.L.R 408 (1988),1 15). 
95 Id. at 194. 
96 Id. 
97 The Advocate General's opinion is not binding on the ECl or Member States, but 
the decision of the panel of judges of the ECl is binding. See German Sex Bias Rules "Unlaw-
jitl, "FIN. TIMES, May 27,1997, at 29 [hereinafter German Sex Bias Rules]. 
98 See Opinion of Advocate General Giuseppe Tesauro, Case C-450/93, 1995 E.C.R 1-
3051, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R 175 (1995), at 182 n.l0 [hereinafter Tesauro Opinion]. 
99 See id. at 181-82. 
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ity. "100 Advocate General Tesauro then listed three forms of positive 
action. 
The first form of positive action attempts to remove the cause of 
fewer employment and career opportunities offered to women.101 Vo-
cational guidance and training further this objective.l02 The second 
form addresses the dual responsibilities that women face raising a 
family and maintaining a career and the difficulty of sharing these 
responsibilities with men.103 Providing flexible working hours, devel-
oping child-care programs, and allowing mothers who have devoted 
significant years to child-rearing to return to work are a few examples 
of how to distribute responsibilities between the sexes.104 These two 
forms of positive action aim to achieve "equal opportunities" and "sub-
stantive equality. "105 With either model the results are not immediate.l06 
The third form of positive action, the type of positive action ques-
tioned in Kalanke, is remedial and addresses the continuing effects of 
historical discrimination.107 This form of positive action "takes on a 
compensatory nature, with the result that preferential treatment in 
favour of disadvantaged categories is legitimised, in particular 
through systems of quotas and goals. "108 Advocate General Tesauro 
rejected this form of positive action and limited the scope of Article 
2(4) to permit positive action programs only so far as they "promote 
and achieve equal opportunities" between the sexes by removing all 
current barriers affecting the employment opportunities ofwomen.109 
100 [d. at 181 (emphasis added); see Moens, supra note 69, at 44. Moens defines "equal-
ity of opportunity" as allowing "indhiduals to compete for employment solely on the basis 
of characteristics relevant to satisfactory performance, and not on the basis of generally 
extraneous factors such as sex or race." [d. "Equality of result" is the ''belief that a 'nearly 
random distribution of women or other minorities in alljobs' would be expected to occur 
in the absence of discriminatory practices." [d. at 45 (citing Lance W. Roberts, Understand-
ing Affirmative Action, in DISCRIMINATION, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
145,157 (W.E. Block & MA Walker eds., 1982». 
101 See Tesauro Opinion, supra note 98, at 181. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
105 [d. at 182. Advocate General Tesauro defined "substantive equality" as a "positive 
concept by basing itself precisely on the relevance of those different factors themselves in 
order to legitimise an unequal right, which is to be used in order to achieve equality as 
between persons who are regarded not as neutral but having regard to their diffel"ences." 
Tesauro Opinion, supra note 98, at 185. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. at 182. It is this third form that has come under the most attack. See id. 
108 [d. 
109 See Tesauro Opinion, supm note 98, at 183. Advocate General Tesauro rejected the 
Gennan law based on his belief of the concept of equal opportunities within the ETD. He 
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Advocate General Tesauro defined equal opportunities to mean 
the same "starting points"110 and concluded that since the two candi-
dates were of equal qualifications, they were at the same "starting 
point." He decided that the German rule "manifestly and unques-
tionably conflicts with the principle of equal treatment as defined in 
Article 2(1)" and "is not caught by the exception contained in Article 
2 (4) of the directive, since, far from fostering equal opportunities for 
women, it aims to confer the results on them directly. "111 
The Kalanke decision was met with much criticism throughout 
the EU from legal commentators as well as from the Commission.ll2 
The Commission issued an interpretive communication which first 
noted that equality of opportunity for women is a "task of paramount 
importance. "113 It then surveyed the United States case law on af-
firmative action and stated that the Kalanke decision should be inter-
preted narrowly. It set forth a range of actions that Member States can 
take with respect to positive actions that are consistent with Kalanke.114 
These include goals and timetables but not a rigid quota system in 
which women are given automatic preference over men.115 The 
Commission emphasized the need for continuing positive action 
measures, and in doing so, stated that quota systems, which are not 
believed that "giving equal opportunities can only mean putting people in a position to 
attain equal results and hence restoring conditions of equality as between members of the 
two sexes as regards starting points." Id. Therefore, in order to obtain equal opportunities, 
to create "starting points," the barriers affecting the employment opportunities of women 
must be identified and then removed. See id. 
llO Advocate General Tesauro cautioned that creating equal "starting points" \\ill not 
achieve the equality sought; rather, other influences, such as the dual role of women as 
mothers and employees and past discrimination, need to be considered when the number 
of women in a particular field of employment is marginal. See id. at 184. 
mId. at 189. Advocate General Tesauro acknowledged the existence of opposition to 
his view and in favor of such legislation, but stated that this "trend" is not the proper trend 
for the ECJ to follow. See Tesauro Opinion, supra note 98, at 189. He further stated that any 
attempt to equalize the representation of women by simply using numerical levels as the 
basis will be insufficient unless the numerical levels are accompanied by measures specifi-
cally tailored to reach equality. See id. at 190. He concluded that there is a need for a sig-
nificant alteration in the social, economic and cultural basis of the European Community 
that allows such inequalities to continue. See id. 
112 See Sara Moore, Nothing Positive from the CQltrl of justice, 21 EUR. L. REv. 156 (1996); 
Linda Senden, Positive Action in the EU Put to the Test: A Negative Score?, 3 MAASTRICHT J. 
EUR. & COMPo L. 146 (1996). But see Eric F. Hinton, The Limits of Af[zrmative Action in the 
European Union: Echaard Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 6 ThXAS J. WOMEN & L. 215 
(1997). 
!l3 Communication on the Kalanke Ruling, supra note 61, at 2. The Commission has 
always adopted a very favorable attitude towards positive action. See id. 
114 See id. at 3. 
115 See id. 
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automatic, remain unaffected by the ECl's ruling.116 It further rec-
ommended that the ETD be amended to specifically provide that 
positive action is permitted where one sex is underrepresented, pro-
vided that the employer can consider the particular circumstances of 
each case. 
B. Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen 
Two years later, the ECJ was given the opportunity to expand and 
to clarify its position on affirmative action in Marschall v. Land Nord-
rhein-Westjalen.1l7 In that case, Marschall challenged the German rule 
that provided: 
[w]here, in the sector of the authority responsible for pro-
motion, there are fewer women than men in the particular 
higher grade post in the career bracket, women are to be 
given priority for promotion in the event of equal suitability, 
competence and professional performance, unless reasons 
specific to an individual [male] candidate tilt the balance in 
his favour. II8 
As in Kalanke, it was undisputed that both the female and male candi-
dates were equally qualified and that the female candidate was ap-
pointed because of the preference in the law.119 The Verwalt-
ungsgericht, otherwise known as the Administrative Court, referred 
the case to the ECl on the question of whether the national rule was 
within the scope of the ETD.I20 Two Member States, France and the 
United Kingdom, urged that the Kalanke rule be applied. The Com-
mission and four Member States argued that the German law was con-
sistent with the equality principle. 
116 See id. at 9. The Commission gave examples of positive action programs that were 
not affected by the Kalanke decision, such as "quotas linked to the qualifications required 
for the job, as long as they allow account to be taken of particular circulllstances which 
might, in a given case, justify an exception to the plinciple of gi~ing preference to the 
underrepresented sex" and "plans for promoting women, prescribing the proportions and 
the time limits within which the nmnber of women should be increased but without impos-
ing an automatic preference rule when individual decisions on recruitment and promo-
tion are taken." Communication on the Kalallke Ruling, supra note 61, at 9. It is interest-
ing to note that in its discussion of positive action, the Commission referred to the relevant 
United States legislation and case law on affirmative action. See id. at 6. 
117 See Case C409/95, supmnote 12. 
118Id. at 167. 
119 See id. 
120 For the text of the articles of the ETD, see Council Directive 76/207, supra note 7. 
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The ECJ upheld the German law and recognized that positive 
action limited to "providing occupational training and guidance for 
women or ... influencing the sharing of occupational and family re-
sponsibilities is not sufficient to put an end to ... partitioning of la-
bour markets."121 It held that Article 2(4) of the ETD authorizes na-· 
tional measures that are related "to access to employment, including 
promotion, which give a specific advantage to women with a view to 
improving their ability to compete on the labour market and to pur-
sue a career on an equal footing with men"122 because "although dis-
criminatory in appearance, [they] are in fact intended to eliminate or 
reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the reality of 
social life. "123 The Eel reasoned that based upon the experiences of 
Germany and other nations in the EU, just because a male and a fe-
male candidate may be equally qualified, it does not mean equal op-
portunities exist.124 The ECJ noted: 
[E]ven where male and female candidates are equally quali-
fied, male candidates tend to be promoted in preference to 
female candidates particularly because of prejudices and 
stereotypes concerning the role and capacities of women in 
working life and the fear, for example, that women will in-
terrupt their careers more frequently, that owing to house-
hold and family duties they will be less flexible in their work-
ing hours, or that they will be absent from work more 
frequently because of pregnancy, childbirth and breastfeed-
ing.125 
Marschall reflects a major change regarding positive action from the 
Kalanke opinion which held that the guarantee of an equal starting 
point was sufficient. 
The ECJ distinguished Marschall from Kalanke by noting that, al-
though remedial in nature, the law in dispute did not guarantee pri-
ority to women over men as did the law in Kalanke.l26 The law's "sav-
121 Case C409/95, supra note 12, at 168. 
122 Id. at 169 (citing C450/93, Kalanke, 1995 E.C.R 1-3501, [1996] All ER (EC) 66 
(1995), t 19). 
123 Id. (citing Case 312/86, Commission v. France, 1988 E.C.R 6315, t 15; Kalanke, 
1995 E.C.R 1-3501, [1996] All ER (EC) 66 (1995), t 18). 
124 See id. at 170. 
125Id. at 169-70. 
126 Case C409/95, supra note 12, at 169. 
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ings clause"127 gave priority to women unless the male candidate had 
specific characteristics that tilted the balance in his favor. 128 
In reaching this result, the ECJ rejected the opinion of Advocate 
General Jacobs,129 who argued that the German law at issue was un-
lawful when read in light of the Kalanke opinion.13o Advocate General 
Jacobs interpreted the holding of Kalanke to mean that any national 
rule which goes further than advancing "equal opportunities" by at-
tempting to obtain "equal representation" is beyond the scope of Ar-
ticles 2(1) and 2(4) of the ETD and hence unlawful.l31 
127 The sa,ings clause 
pro\ides for male candidates who are equally as qualified as the female can-
didates a guarantee that the candidatures will be the subject of an objective 
assessment which will take account of all criteria specific to the indi,idual 
candidates and will ovenide the priority accorded to female candidates where 
one or more ofthose criteria tilts the balance in favour of the male candidate. 
In this respect. however, it should be remembered that those Cliteria must not 
be such as to discriminate against female candidates. 
!d. at 170. 
128 See id. at 169. 
129 Advocate GeneralJacobs' opinion is not binding on the ECJ or Member States. See 
Gennan Sex Bias Rules, supra note 97, at 29. Advocate General Jacobs reasoned that the 
sa\ings clause of the national rule only displaced the rule granting women priority and did 
not change the "discriminatory nature of the rule." Opinion of Advocate General F.G. 
Jacobs, Case C409/95, [1997] All ER (EC) 865 (1997), [1998] CEC (CCH) 152 (1997), at 
161 [hereinafter Jacobs Opinion]. Further, Advocate GeneralJacobs stated that if an abso-
lute rule granting women priority based on their sex is unlawful, then a "conditional rule 
which either gives p1iority to women on the ground of their sex or gives priority to men on 
the basis of admittedly discriminatory criteria must a fortiori be lmlawful." Id. at 162. 
130 Advocate GeneralJacobs noted that the ETD had been promulgated almost twenty 
years before the decision at hand, and as such, believed social characteristics had been 
altered. See id. at 164. Any change in the ETD or subsequent legislation was a matter for 
the legislators, not the courts. See id. His proposal related to the concept of equal pay, not 
affirmative action, and therefore was not directly controlling. See id. 
13l SeeJacobs Opinion, supra note 129, at 161. Ad"ocate GeneralJacobs commented on 
the scope of Article 2 ( 4) of the ETD and posited some measures which may be permissible 
under the current applicable law. See id. at 163. One exanlple of a permissible measure 
Wlitten in gender-neutral terms would be to grant an age-limit extension to candidates who 
ha"e taken at least a year off work to rear a child, even if such a measure disproportion-
ately benefits women. See id. In addition, certain measures enacted to eradicate specific 
disadvantages faced solely by working women are permissible under Article 2(4) irrespec-
tive of whether the language is gender~pecific or gender-neutral. See id. Citing language 
from the decision in Kalanke, authored by Advocate General Tesauro, Advocate General 
Jacobs stated that "[p]ermissible directly discriminatory measures under art. 2(4) 'must 
therefore be directed at removing the obstacles preventing women from ha,ing equal op-
pOl·tunities by tackling, for example, educational guidance and "ocational training.'" Id. 
Furthermore, Article 4(1) of the COll\'ention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women states that "temporary special measures" aimed at sexual equality 
are not discriminatory prmided they "in no way entail as a consequence the maintenance 
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Despite Advocate GeneralJacobs' opinion, the Marschall decision 
did much to renew the permissibility of positive action programs 
within the EU by dispelling some of the uncertainty caused by the Ka-
lanke decision.132 Nevertheless, commentators disagree on how to in-
terpret the decision. The North-Rhine Westphalia Minister for Equal 
Opportunities for Men and Women was pleased with the outcome of 
Marschall and promoted quotas to permit gender discrimination fa-
voring women where they are underrepresented in the job market.133 
Others contended that the Marschall ruling failed to clarify the con-
flict between the equality plinciple and provisions providing for posi-
tive action for the underrepresented sex,134 
C. Affirmative Action in the United States 
Unlike the EU, the United States has stepped back from, rather 
than expanded, its commitment to affirmative action. The constitu-
tionality and fairness of affirmative action progranls have been the 
focus of ongoing debate in the United States for almost half a cen-
tury. While most of the constitutional debate has centered on race-
based affirmative action programs,135 gender-based programs have 
also been affected. The same legal principles apply to both race-based 
and gender-based preferences, albeit in slightly different forms, be-
cause the relevant constitutional provision is the Equal Protection 
Clause of the United States Constitution.136 
of unequal or separate standards .... [T]hese measures shall be discontinued when the 
objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved." Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, art. lV, t 1, 
1249 U.N.T.S. 13; see also Julie A Mertus, International Decision: Marschall v. Land Nord-
rhein-Westfalen, 92 AM.]. INT'L L. 296, 297 (1998). 
132 See Mertus, supra note 131, at 300. 
m See Equal opportunities: Disagreements About H(fU) to Interpret Marschall Judgment, EUR. 
REp.,Jan. 28, 1998. 
1M Seeid. 
135 For Supreme Court cases using a heightened scrutiny for race-specific classifica-
tions, see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No.1, 
458 U.S. 457 (1982); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Lovingv. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); 
McLaughlin v. FlOlida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); SU'auder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 
(1879). 
136 Although the Equal Protection Clause applies only to actions of state governments, 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, 
substantially embodies the equal protection guaranties of the Equal Protection Clause of 
the FOlllteenth Amendment. 
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The Supreme Court's first substantive decision on affirmative ac-
tion came in 1978 in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.137 
The case concerned the constitutionality of a program mandating 
that sixteen seats be set aside each year in the state medical school for 
minority applicants.138 The Court, though sharply divided, ruled that 
the state had a legitimate interest in achieving a diverse student body 
and could use race as a factor in the admissions process in order to 
achieve diversity.139 However, the school's rigid two-track approach 
amounted to a quota and was unconstitutional. l40 
Mter Bakke, the Court decided several other cases which involved 
the claim that affirmative action programs violated Title VII because 
they discriminated based upon race or gender. Unlike the EU ap-
proach, which specifically permits but does not require positive action 
programs, Title VII is silent with respect to affirmative action. It nei-
ther requires affirmative efforts on the part of employers to correct 
imbalances in the work force, nor prohibits the use of affirmative ac-
tion programs to correct such imbalances. 
In 1979, in United Steelworkers Of America v. Weber, the Court held 
that an affirmative action plan, which reserved 50% of future craft 
jobs for blacks, did not violate Title VIJ.141 The Court so held because 
the purpose of the plan mirrored the purpose of the Civil Rights Act 
and did not unnecessarily trammel the interests of white employees.142 
137 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
138Id. at 269-70. 
139 ld. at 362. 
140 ld. at 378. 
141 See 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Heber challenged the legality of an affirmative action plan 
that was collectively bargained for by an employer and a lUlion and that reserved for black 
employees 50% of job openings in an in-plant, craft-training program lUltil the percentage 
of black craft-workers in the plant was commensurate with the percentage of blacks in the 
local labor force. See id. at 197. The Supreme Court ruled that Title VII of the Chil Rights 
Act of 1964 permitted employers and lUlions in the private sector to take such race-
conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job 
categories. See id. 
142Justice Brennan explained that: 
[t]he purposes of the plan mirror those of the statute. Both were designed to 
break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy. Both were struc-
tured to "open employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations which 
have been traditionally closed to them." At the same time, the plan does not 
unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees. The plan does 
not require the discharge of white workers and their replacement with new 
black hirees. Nor does the plan create an absolute bar to the advancement of 
white employees; half of those trained in the program will be white. Moreo-
ver, the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial bal-
ance, but simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance. 
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The goal of Title VII is twofold: to root out invidious discrimination 
against any person on the basis of race or gender and to eliminate the 
lasting effects of such discrimination.143 
The reasoning in lli>berwas applied in 1987 to a case brought by a 
male plaintiff who challenged the legality of using sex as a factor 
when deciding to promote an individual to the position of road dis-
patcher. l44 In Johnson v. Transportation Agenl)', Santa Clara County, Cali-
fornia, an affirmative action plan for hiring and promoting minorities 
and women was voluntarily adopted by the Santa Clara County Trans-
portation Agency.145 The plan allowed the agency to consider the 
gender of a qualified applicant when making promotions to positions 
in a "traditionally" segregated job area where women had been "sig-
nificantly underrepresented" at the time the plan was implemented. l46 
The plan's long-term goal was to achieve a labor force that reflected 
the proportion of minorities and women in that respective area.147 
The plan did not set aside a specific number of positions for minori-
ties or women.l48 Pursuant to the plan, a male employee, Johnson, was 
passed over for promotion in favor of a female employee, although 
both were rated as "qualified for the job."149 Although no prior intent 
to discriminate was involved, the Court upheld the plan.150 It noted 
that the plan was justified because of the manifest imbalance of 
women in traditionally segregated job categories. l5l Additionally, the 
plan was temporary and did not mandate that women be given pref-
erence over men, only that gender could be considered as a factor. 152 
During the past decade, however, affirmative action programs, 
particularly in the public sector, have faced an increasingly hostile 
Court. In 1989, in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co. (Croson), the Su-
preme Court applied strict scnltiny to affirmative action programs for 
the first time.153 In Croson, the city of Richmond enacted a minority 
set-aside program for construction projects in which the city enter-
[d. at 208 (citations omitted). 
1-13 See id. 
144 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 619 
(1987). 
145 See id. 
146 Id. at 620-21. 
147 Id. at 620. 
148 Id. at 622. 
149 480 U.S. 616, 623 (1987). 
150 [d. at 641-42. 
151 See id. at 637. 
152 See id. at 638-40. 
153 See 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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tained bids.154 This program was enacted without any specific statisti-
cal proof of past discrimination.155 The Supreme Court declared the 
plan unconstitutional.156 In order for the program to pass constitu-
tional muster, Richmond would have to show that a definite pattern of 
discrimination against a qualified minority contractor existed,157 Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice O'Connor noted: 
Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from 
taking action to rectify the effects of identified discrimina-
tion within its jurisdiction. If the city of Richmond had evi-
dence before it that nonminority contractors were systemati-
cally excluding minority businesses from subcontracting 
opportunities it could take action to end the discriminatory 
exclusion. Where there is a significant statistical disparity be-
tween the number of qualified minority contractors willing 
and able to perform a particular service and the number of 
such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the local-
ity's prime contractors, an inference of discriminatory exclu-
sion could arise.158 
Further, Justice O'Connor found that: 
[u]nder such circumstances, the city could act to dismantle 
the closed business system by taking appropriate measures 
against those who discriminate on the basis of race or other 
illegitimate criteria .... In the extreme case, some form of 
narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary to 
break down patterns of deliberate exclusion.159 
In evaluating federal race-based affirmative action programs, the 
Court in 1995, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, indicated that such 
programs, whether imposed by federal, state or local governments, 
will be subject to strict scrutiny.loo The Court must be satisfied that a 
154 ld. at 477. 
155 ld. at 499. 
156 ld. at 51l. 
157 ld. at 510-1l. 
158 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989). 
159 ld. (citation omitted). 
160 515 U.S. 200 (1995). This case involved the stipulation in the Small Business Ad-
ministration regulations that most federal agency contI"acts must contain a subcontI"actor 
compensation clause, which gives a prime contractor a financial incentive to hire subcon-
tractors certified as small businesses contI"olled by socially and economically disadvantaged 
indhiduals, and requires the contractor to presume that such illdhiduals include minori-
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prior intent to discriminate has been proven, and thus, a compelling 
governmental interest to compensate for such discrimination exists.161 
Further, the means adopted must be narrowly tailored to meet this 
goal.l62 In the past, every governmental practice or program based on 
race has been struck down when viewed through the strict scrutiny 
lens. Indeed, the test has been characterized as "strict in theory, but 
fatal in fact" since once applied, the challenged practice has almost 
always been invalidated.163 
Of particular interest is a recent case, Taxman v. Board of Educa-
tion,l64 which was scheduled to be decided by the Supreme Court in 
the 1997-98 term, but was dismissed because the litigants settled be-
fore argument. In Taxman, a white teacher who was dismissed because 
of a reduction in the work force due to budgetary restraints, brought 
suit against the school district.165 It was stipulated that Taxman pos-
sessed qualifications equal to those of a black teacher who was re-
tained. l66 The teachers were deemed equal in that they were both 
hired on the same day and were of "equal ability" with "equal qualifi-
cations," leaving race the only factor to distinguish between tlle 
teachers.167 The white teacher was discharged because of the affirma-
tive action plan previously adopted. 168 The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that the plaintiffs layoff violated Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, because such an affirmative action program was 
used solely to promote diversity within the school system.169 Diversity 
ties or any other individuals found to be disadvantaged by the Small Business Administra-
tion. See id. 
161Id. at 277. 
162 [d. 
163 Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Breyerjoined in dissent, stated that "the strict 
standard announced is indeed 'fatal' for classifications burdening groups that have suf-
fered discrimination in our society." [d. at 275. Justice O'Connor, however, noted that "we 
wish to dispel the notion that suict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact.'" 515 U.S. 
200,237 (1995) (quoting Justice Marshall's concurrence in Fullilaue v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 
448,519 (1980». "[T]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering ef-
fects of racial discrimination against minOlity groups in this country" is an unfortunate 
reality, and "[g]overmnent is not disqualified fi'om acting in response to [it]." [d. at 202. 
1&1 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), and cert. dismissed, 
118 S. Ct. 595 (1997). 
165 [d. at 1551-52. 
166 [d. at 1551. 
167 [d. 
168 [d. 
169 91 F.3d 1547,1567 (3d. CiI; 1997), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), and cert. dis-
missed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997). 
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itself, the Court said, cannot be considered a compelling state inter-
est.170 
While the courts are clearly narrowing the scope of permissible 
affirmative action programs, affirmative action has also come under 
attack by state governments and citizen-initiated referenda. For ex-
ample, California, Delaware and Texas, among other states, have im-
plemented legislation which bans the use of preferences based on 
race, sex, ethnicity or national origin in any state program.l7l At the 
federal level, the effectiveness of affirmative action programs has been 
effectively vitiated even though the affirmative action provisions of 
Executive Order 11246 technically continue to exist.172 In 1995, the 
Labor Department issued a policy stating that unlawful preferences 
and quotas will not be permitted in any government program. In-
170Id. at 1558. 
171 See Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cron)lism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical 
Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making Under Title 
VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 1003 (1997). McGinley states: 
The California Civil Rights Initiative, or, as it is commonly known, Proposition 
209, resulted from public displeasure with affirmative action and was fueled 
by these groups. Proposition 209, which bans the use of preferences based on 
race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin, has inspired other state legisla-
tors from Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, South Carolina, and Texas to enact 
similar legislation. Moreover, former Senator Bob Dole proposed a similar bill 
at the federal level. 
Id. at 1036-37 (citations omitted). 
172 See Clint Bolick, JUlisprudence in Wonderland: \tny Judge Hendcrson s Decision Was 
Wrong, 2 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 59, 59-62 (1997); Mary J. Reyburn, Strict Scrutin)1 Across the 
Boan:l: The Effect of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena 011 Race-Based Affirmative Action Pro-
grams, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 1405, 1414-16 (1996). 
President Lyndon B. Johnson furthered the federal commitment to equal 
employment opportunities in 1965 by signing Executive Order 11,246, requir-
ing all federal agencies to establish equal employment plans. Since then, af-
firmative action programs have been embroiled in endless controversy. The 
legality of various aspects of the concept ha,·e culminated in multiple Su-
preme Court opinions. Unfortunately, the Court's decisions have failed to 
clarify the constitutionality of affirmative action programs. 
Reyburn, supra note 172, at 1414-16. See also Stephen C. Simpson, The Self-Critical Anal)lsis 
Privilege In Employment Law, 21 J. CORP. L. 577, 596 (1996) (''The controversy ... is the 
potential 'chilling effect'-that companies will fail to develop voluntary plans or to comply 
with legislation such as Executive Order 11,246, or that they will do so with one eye on 
possible future litigation. Accordingly, their affirmative action goals may suffer."); U.S. 
Department of Labor, Numerical Goals Under Executive Order 11246 ("In the context of Ex-
ecutive Order 11246, the Clinton administration's U.S. Department of Labor has taken the 
position that the requirement that federal contractors take affirmative action does not 
require preferential treaUnent, and that indeed in most instances preferential treatment is 
illegal."). 
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stead, the Department encouraged efforts focused on outreach pro-
grams designed to broaden the pool of qualified candidates. 
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court sanctioned affirmative 
action programs more than thirty years ago, debate about the legiti-
macy and wisdom of such programs continues. Indeed, in attempting 
to evaluate the legality of specific programs, one is faced with an ever-
changing legal landscape. 
III. THE AMSTERDAM TREATY'S IMPACT ON POSITIVE ACTION IN THE 
EU 
While the United States appears to be stepping back from its 
commitment to affirmative action to eliminate all vestiges of discrimi-
nation, the EU has been developing its own jurisprudence of positive 
action through directives, decisions of the ECj, and now through spe-
cific provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty. 173 
Although the EC Treaty focuses on economic integration rather 
than on human rights, the ECj declared early on that respect for hu-
man rights is one of the general principles of Community law.174 Fur-
thermore, the TEU imposes an obligation on the EU to "respect fun-
damental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in 
Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community law."175 The Amsterdam Treaty, signed by the Member 
States on October 2, 1997, and effective May 1, 1999, strengthens the 
EU's commitment to human rights in a number of ways and explicitly 
affirms that the identity of the EU is based on democracy and human 
rights. 
The Amsterdam Treaty adds to the TEU an explicit statement 
that "the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
Id. 
173ECTREATY, supra note 1, art. 141(3). 
The Council, acting in accordance with the pl"Ocedure refelTed to in Article 
I89b [now Article 251], and after consulting the Economic and Social Com-
mittee, shall adopt measmes to ensme the application of the principle of 
equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation, including the principle of equal pay for equal 
work or work of equal value. 
174 Defrenne III, supra note 23, at 1378. 
175 TEU, supra note 14, art. 6. 
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law, principles which are common to the Member States."176 In addi-
tion, sanctions may be imposed on a Member State in cases of a "seri-
ous and persistent breach" of these principles.177 The Amsterdam 
Treaty also adds the explicit requirement that "the Court, wherever it 
has jurisdiction, ... apply these human rights standards in relation to 
acts of the institutions of the Union."178 This requirement adopts the 
ECJ principle that conformity with human rights standards is "a nec-
essary condition for the lawfulness of Community acts. "179 
The Amsterdam Treaty is particularly important with respect to 
furthering equality between men and women throughout the EU and 
is a major step forward with respect to implementing equality in the 
work force. The Amsterdam Treaty goes beyond existing EU legisla-
tion regarding gender equality in employment and imposes a general 
obligation on the Union in all of its activities to eliminate inequalities 
and to promote equality. In addition to clarifYing, developing and ex-
panding the EC Treaty provisions on equality, the Amsterdam Treaty 
adopts the comparable worth concept first set out in the EPD and re-
quires "equal pay for work of equal value. "180 
The Amsterdam Treaty also adds two new provisions to the Arti-
cle 141 equality principle. The first provision requires the Council, 
under qualified majority voting, to adopt measures to ensure equal 
opportunity and equal treatment of men and women in employ-
ment. I81 The second provision allows Member States to adopt and 
maintain positive action provisions. It states: 
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between 
men and women in working life, the principle of equal 
treatment shall not prevent any Member State from main-
taining or adopting measures providing for specific advan-
tages in order to make it easier for the underrepresented sex 
to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate 
for disadvantages in professional careers. 182 
176Id. 
177 See White Paper, supra note 9, at 3.2. 
178Id. at 3.5. 
179Id. 
180 See EC TREATY, supra note 1, art. HI. 
181 See id. art. 141 (3). 
182Id. art. 141(4). The terlll "undelTepresented sex" replaces "women" fOWld in EC 
Treaty Article 141. 
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Although the term "underrepresented sex" replaces the term 
"women" as the focus of positive action, a declaration by Member 
States stipulates that such action should in the first instance aim at 
improving the situation of women in working life.183 This provision, 
therefore, implicitly rejects the holding of Kalanke that a positive ac-
tion program is only permitted with respect to access to employment, 
instead permitting affirmative action with respect to other aspects of 
employment activities. 
Finally, the Amsterdam Treaty expands the scope of the equality 
principle and allows the Council to take action against discrimination 
based on sex, race or ethnic Oligin, religion or belief, disability, age, 
or sexual orientation within the limits of its powers. Given the ever-
expanding scope of Community activities, the Council is vested with 
broad authority to combat discrimination. 
These amendments, declarations, requirements and provisions184 
afford greater flexibility to the equality principle and should influ-
ence the ECJ in future cases. They affirm the EU's commitment to 
promote equality between men and women in employment as well as 
in general. It is clear that Member States may use positive action to 
promote equality between men and women in employment, not only 
with respect to access to employment but also with respect to all other 
aspects of employment. 
Although the Kalanke and Marschall quandaries have been re-
solved, other issues remain to be addressed. The Amsterdam Treaty 
encourages Member States to make progress in the field of equal 
treatment between men and women in employment, but implementa-
tion of the equality principle by Member States has been problematic 
in the past. The Amsterdam Treaty gives little guidance for the future 
concerning measures the Council will adopt to ensure the application 
of nondiscrimination in employment, and while Member States may 
implement positive action programs, they are not required. 
CONCLUSION 
The EU has benefited from what began as an economic incen-
tive-"equal pay for equal work"-and has eventually evolved this 
183 Declaration on AI-ticle 119(4) [now AI-ticle 141(4)] of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community, Alnsterdam Treaty, supra note 1, declo 28. 
184 The AInsterdam Treaty also includes a declaration to AI-ticle 141 which states: 
"[w]hen adopting measures referred to in Article 119(4) [now Article 141(4)] of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, Member States should, in the first instance, 
aim at improving the situation of women in working life." ld. 
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concept into a social commitment to equality between men and 
women in employment and in all other areas of Union activity. The 
Amsterdam Treaty greatly raises the awareness of the issues regarding 
discrimination between men and women in employment as well as 
beyond the workplace and allows Member States to enact appropriate 
legislation. But experience with the EPD and the ETD indicates tlIat 
implementation is the key. As a result, Member States will likely con-
tinue to need prodding from the ECl and the Commission to fully 
implement the new equality provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty. In 
addition, the Council itself will need to be encouraged to take the 
necessary action to fully implement the nondiscrimination provisions 
of the Amsterdam Treaty. Although there is much potential for fur-
thering equality in the EU, there is no guarantee that effective action 
will be taken or that the provisions have gone far enough. 
